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I. INTRODUCTION
Under common law, repairs made by a defendant after an accident
were excluded from evidence when offered by the plaintiff to prove neg-
ligence or culpable conduct.' By the late nineteenth century, the doc-
trine was firmly adopted in the American system.2 The common law
rule is based on the reasoning that (1) subsequent repairs by the defend-
ant are not necessarily an admission of negligence 3 and should not be
1. See Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 21 L.T.R.N.S. 261 (1869).
2. See, e.g., Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 16 N.W. 358 (Minn. 1883) (holding that
evidence that the defendant had repaired or changed a defective switch one year after a railroad
accident is not admissible as evidence of previous negligence). See also 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
& KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5282 (1980).
The Supreme Court decided the issue in Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S.
202 (1892), by excluding evidence of an altered conveyor belt. "[I]t is now well settled, upon
much consideration, by the decisions of the highest courts of most of the States in which the
question has arisen, that the evidence is incompetent... Id. at 207.
3. At common law, evidence of a subsequent remedial measure was deemed irrelevant.
Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, such evidence, not withstanding Rule 407
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, would be admitted as relevant under the broad definition of
relevancy in Rule 401 of the Federal Rules. Rule 401 states: " 'Relevant evidence' means
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construed as such by the jury;' and (2) subsequent repairs should be
encouraged to mitigate the possibility of further injury.5
The common law rule of the inadmissibility of evidence of subse-
quent repairs was codified in 1969 in Rule 407 of the Preliminary Draft
Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 Rule 407 was revised in 19711 and promul-
gated by the Supreme Court in 1973 without change.8 During Congres-
sional consideration, Rule 407 was thought to be "noncontroversial"; 9 it
was neither the subject of floor debate, nor discussed during committee
hearings in the House of Representatives. 0 Congress adopted Rule 407
when it enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence on January 2, 1975.1
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previ-
ously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpa-
ble conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 401.
4. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. at 202. "[T]he taking of such precautions against the future is not to
be construed as an admission of responsibility for the past, has no legitimate tendency to prove
that the defendant had been negligent before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract
the minds of the jury from the real issue, and to create a prejudice against the defendant." Id. at
204. See 2 C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 267 (4th ed. 1992); 2 J. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 283 (Chadbourne rev. 1979).
5. A person may have exercised all the care which the law required, and yet in the
light of his new experience, after an unexpected accident has occurred, and as a
measure of extreme caution, he may adopt additional safeguards. The more careful
a person is, the more regard he has for the lives of others, the more likely he would
be to do so, and it would seem unjust that he could not do so without being liable to
have such acts construed as an admission of prior negligence. We think such a rule
puts an unfair interpretation upon human conduct, and virtually holds out an
inducement for continued negligence.
Morse, 16 N.W. at 359 (citations omitted).
6. FED. R. EvID. 407 (Preliminary Draft 1969); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5282
n.1. The first statutory provision dealing with the common law rule was Rule 308 of the Model
Code of Evidence, which states:
Evidence of the taking of a precaution by a person to prevent the repetition of a
previous harm or the occurrence of a similar harm or evidence of the adoption of a
plan requiring that such a precaution be taken is inadmissible as tending to prove
that his failure to take such a precaution to prevent the previous harm was negligent.
7. PROP. FED. R. EvID. 407, 1971, 51 F.R.D. 315, 352; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2,
§ 5281 n.2.
8. PROP. FED. R. EVID. 407, 1973, 56 F.R.D. 183, 225; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2,
§ 5281 n.4.
9. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5281.
10. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 407-1 (1992).
11. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
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RULE 407
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 2
The common law exclusionary rule for subsequent remedial meas-
ures was uniformly applied only to negligence actions.1 3 By the mid-
twentieth century, the application of the exclusionary rule was narrowed
primarily to negligence actions dealing with personal injury and prop-
erty damage.1 4 However, the development of the "products liability"
theory of tort law has caused considerable controversy over the proper
applicability of Rule 407 to products liability cases. Absent congres-
sional guidance on the issue, 15 courts have looked to Rule 407's terms
and its underlying rationale to determine its applicability to products lia-
bility actions. This has resulted in inconsistent and conflicting applica-
tion of Rule 407 by the federal circuit courts of appeal. The lack of any
clear ground on which the courts may base a determination of the many
issues concerning Rule 407 and products liability actions suggests a con-
fusion and tension among the courts as to how the rule should be
applied, creating even greater confusion among litigants. Therefore, the
question is whether Rule 407 should be applied at all in the area of
products liability? This Comment addresses this issue and finds that if
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 maintains its present form in both statu-
tory and case law, the rule should not be applied in products liability
cases.
This Comment surveys the current judicial treatment of Rule 407 in
the federal courts of appeals in products liability cases. Section II dis-
cusses the rationale underlying Rule 407 and focuses on the rule's social
policy concerns. Section III examines the conflict among the circuits on
the issue of whether Rule 407 should apply at all in strict products liabil-
ity claims. Section IV addresses the courts' application of Rule 407 to
products liability cases in terms of the rule's scope and its exceptions.
Section V analyzes the general application of Rule 407. Finally, Section
VI proposes a possible solution for the present confusion regarding Rule
407.
II. THE RATIONALE BEHIND RULE 407
The rationale for Rule 407's exclusion of subsequent remedial
12. FED. R. EVID. 407. Hereinafter, all references in the text to "Rule 407" refer to Rule 407
of the FED. R. EVID.
13. John M. Kobayashi, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Recall Letters and Notices, in
PRODUCT LIABILITY 1989: WARNINGS, INSTRUCTIONS AND RECALLS 503, 512 (Practicing Law
Institute 1989).
14. Roger C. Henderson, Product Liability and Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial
Measures: Resolving the Conflict by Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence and Strict
Tort Liability, 64 NEB. L. REv. 1, 2 (1985).
15. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.
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measures is based on two separate grounds, similar in reasoning to the
common law doctrine. First, a subsequent remedial measure may not in
fact be an admission of negligence or culpable conduct.' 6 Second, peo-
ple will not repair dangerous situations if their actions will be later used
as evidence against them.'7
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures is sufficiently relevant to allow admission into evidence.' 8
However, Rule 407 retains the common law concern that a subsequent
remedial measure should not be considered an admission of negligence
or culpable conduct because the plaintiffs injury might have resulted
from a mere accident or contributory negligence. Accordingly, the rule
considers repairs as merely additional safeguards or the exercise of a
degree of caution beyond "reasonable care." 9 Legislators and the courts
are also concerned that, if admitted, evidence of subsequent repairs or
improvements would be overvalued by a jury as an admission of negli-
gence or culpable conduct, thereby unfairly prejudicing the defendant.20
These policy concerns constitute the primary force behind Rule
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[02] at 407-14 ("Under the liberal theory of
relevancy embodied in Rule 401, the circumstantial evidence of repair would have force sufficient
to support admission."). See supra note 3.
19. See WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 283.
If machines, bridges, sidewalks, and other objects, never caused corporal injury
except through the negligence of their owner, then his act of improving their
condition, after the happening of an injury thereat, would indicate a belief on his
part that the injury was caused by his negligence. But the assumption is plainly
false; injuries may be, and constantly are, caused by reason of inevitable accident,
and also by reason of contributory negligence of the injured person. To improve the
condition of the injury-causing object is therefore to indicate a belief merely that it
has been capable of causing such an injury, but indicates nothing more, and is
equally consistent with a belief in injury by mere accident, or by contributory
negligence, as well as by the owner's negligence. Mere capacity of a place or thing
to cause injury is not the fact that constitutes a liability for the owner; it must be a
capacity which could have been known to an owner using reasonable diligence and
foresight, and a capacity to injure persons taking reasonable care in its use.
On this ground, then, namely, that the supposed inference from the act is not
the plain and most probable one, such acts of repair or improvement should be
excluded.
Id. at 174-75.
20. "The conduct is not in fact an admission, since the conduct is equally consistent with
injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence. . . .Under a liberal theory of
relevancy [incorporated in Rule 401] this ground alone would not support exclusion as the
inference is still a possible one." FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
Courts, inlcuding the Supreme Court, expressed concern about the prejudicial effect of such
evidence.
[Ilt is now well settled ... that the evidence is incompetent, because the taking of
such precautions against the future is not to be construed as an admission of
responsibility for the past, has no legitimate tendency to prove that the defendant
RULE 407
407. "Unlike most of the other Federal Rules of Evidence ... Rule 407
is based primarily upon policy considerations, and not upon relevancy or
concern for truth finding."21 Rule 407's underlying premise is that peo-
ple will not take any post-accident measures to remedy a safety hazard if
evidence of such measures is susceptible to overemphasis by a jury.22
"[T]hus not only would careful owners refrain from improvements, but
even careless ones, who might have deserved to have the evidence
adduced against them, would by refraining from improvements subject
innocent persons to the risk of the recurrence of the injury."2 3
III. Is RULE 407 APPLIED TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES?
The exact language of Rule 407 refers to the exclusion of evidence
to prove "negligence or culpable conduct," 24 but the rule, the advisory
committee's note, and the legislative history of the rule do not specifi-
cally address the issue of whether Rule 407 bars the admission of evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases.25
This lack of authority has caused confusion over the applicability of
Rule 407 to products liability cases and has led to a split of authority
had been negligent before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract the
minds of the jury from the real issue, and to create a prejudice against the defendant.
Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892); see also Raymond v.
Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991) ("It was thought that jurors would too
readily equate subsequent design modifications with admissions of a prior defective design.").
21. Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863, 867 n.2 (7th Cir. 1980) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting). The Advisory Committee suggests that the policy of encouraging safety is the
principle underlying rationale of the rule. "The other, and more impressive, ground for exclusion
rests on a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from
taking, steps in furtherance of added safety." FED. R. EvID. 407, advisory committee's note. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 267, at 200.
22. WiGMORE, supra note 4, § 283. See Hull v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 812 F.2d 584, 587
(10th Cir. 1987).
23. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 283.
24. FED. R. EVID. 407.
25. See Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 (1984).
The Meller court concluded from the lack of statutory authority on this issue that "[t]he choice of
this particular standard [of negligence or culpable conduct] presumably reflects a conclusion by
the drafters that such evidence, on balance, is markedly less probative on these particular issues
than on others." Id. at 1300 n.5. There is some evidence in the rules that the drafters do make a
distinction between "negligence and culpable conduct" and other types of liability. Federal Rule
of Evidence 408 (in the relevancy section as well) states that evidence of a compromise or offer to
compromise "is not admissible to prove liability." FED. R. EvID. 408 (emphasis added). The
drafters chose the broader term of "liability" over "negligence and culpable conduct." Therefore,
the drafters did make a distinction in their terminology.
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among state26 and federal courts27 regarding the plain language of the
rule and its underlying policy rationale. The majority of the states that
have addressed this issue hold that Rule 407 does not apply in strict
products liability actions, 28 whereas most of the federal circuit courts
hold that the exclusionary rule does apply.29
A. State Courts: Ault v. International Harvester Co.
The Supreme Court of California was the first court to distinguish
between the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures in actions
brought under a theory of negligence and those brought under a theory
of strict products liability.30 In Ault v. International Harvester3 , the
plaintiff brought an action for damages under the theories of strict liabil-
ity, breach of warranty, and negligence after sustaining injuries from a
motor vehicle accident.3 2 The plaintiff alleged that the accident resulted
from a failure of the vehicle's aluminum gear box, which was made of
defective materials. The trial court admitted evidence that three years
after the accident the defendant began manufacturing the gear box out of
malleable iron rather than the less durable aluminum. On appeal, the
26. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5285 n.34 (Supp. 1992). For a further
discussion of the split among state courts, see Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d
1322, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying
Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883,
886-87 nn.2-3 (5th Cir. 1983).
27. The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. For cases where the
Supreme Court has denied certiorari, see Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1322; Cann v. Ford Motor Co.,
658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d
848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124
(1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
28. Krause v. American Aerolights, 762 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Or. 1988); Thomas S. Stewart &
Stacy M. Andreas, Subsequent Remedial Measures: An Analytical Model for Product Liability
Cases, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 74, 79-80; Kobayashi, supra note 13, at 548-49.
29. For an examination of the split among the circuits on the application of Rule 407 to strict
products liability actions, compare Prentiss & Carlisle v. Koehring-Waterous, 972 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1992) (holding Rule 407 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability
case); Cann, 658 F.2d at 54 (same); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992)
(same); Werner, 628 F.2d at 848 (same); Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.
1989) (same); Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); Flaminio v.
Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634
(9th Cir.) (same), amended 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986) with Bizzle v. McKesson Corp., 961 F.2d
719 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that Rule 407 does not apply to strict liability actions); Huffman v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (same).
It should be noted that the Eighth Circuit is the only circuit to consistently refuse to apply
Rule 407 to strict products liability cases. W.E. Brumby II et al., Evidence of Subsequent
Remedial Measures in Products Liability Actions: Recent Conflict in the Courts, 35 MERCER L.
Rev. 1389, 1409 (1984).
30. Brumby, supra note 29, at 1395.
31. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
32. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1149-50.
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Supreme Court of California held that evidence of subsequent repairs is
admissible in products liability cases brought under a theory of strict
liability. 33  The significance of the Ault decision is that it was based
upon section 1151 of California's Evidence Code34 from which Rule
407 was derived.
In making its decision the Ault court relied on the true strict liabil-
ity theory of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.36 The
court distinguished between negligence and strict liability theories by
stating that in order to recover under the latter, a plaintiff need only
prove that the product was defective and not that the defendant breached
his duty of care.37 The court took a strict interpretation of section 1151
33. Ault was being decided while the Federal Rules of Evidence were still pending in
Congress. While the Ault case was pending there were futile efforts made to get the Evidence
Code amended to include strict liability suits.
It is unlikely that the Congressional draftsmen were unaware of the possibility that
the phrase 'culpable conduct' would be held not applicable to strict liability since
the Ault case was much discussed at several continuing legal education programs
dealing with the Evidence Rules that were held in California during this period,
programs that featured the Chairman and the Reporter of the Advisory Committee
and several Congressional staff members.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, note 2, § 5285 n.26 and accompanying text.
In addition, some lawyers urged members of Congress to have Rule 407 amended to make it
clear whether the rule did or did not apply to strict liability cases. Id. § 5285 n.30. See Brumby,
supra note 29, at 1395.
34. California's Evidence Code § 1151 provides:
When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are
taken, which, if taken previously would have tended to make the event less likely to
occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with the event.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966).
35. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note. California Evidence Code § 1151 and
Rule 407 are virtually identical. See supra text accompanying notes 12 & 35. Section 1151 is
California's codification of the subsequent repair rule.
36. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1150. The Restatement states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965).
37. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1150. For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between
negligence and strict liability theories in the field of products liability theories, see generally
Henderson, supra note 14.
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and concluded that "if the Legislature had intended to encompass cases
involving strict liability within the ambit of section 1151, it would have
used an expression less related to and consistent with affirmative fault
than 'culpable conduct'-a term which, under defendant's theory [that it
encompasses strict liability], would embrace a moral rather than a legal
duty."38
The court found that the policy rationale behind section 1151 of
encouraging subsequent repairs applies to negligence cases but that sec-
tion 1151 does not serve the same "anti-deterrent function" in strict
products liability cases. 39 The court reasoned that the rule excluding
evidence of subsequent repairs has no place in the field of products lia-
bility where the "contemporary corporate mass producer of goods" is
unlikely to risk additional liability by refraining from improving his
product because such actions may be used as evidence against him for a
previous injury.40 The court held that the only purpose section 1151 has
in the field of products liability is to "serve[ ] merely as a shield [for the
defendant] against potential liability.'
B. Federal Circuit Courts That Do Not Apply Rule 407 to Products
Liability Cases
The circuit courts primarily address two issues in their determina-
tions of whether Rule 407 applies to strict products liability cases. First,
the courts consider whether the plain language of the rule mandates its
application to strict liability actions. Second, they examine whether the
policy rationale of the rule is served by applying it to these types of
actions.42 Both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have followed the Ault
decision in holding that Rule 407 does not apply to strict products liabil-
ity actions.4 3 These courts have addressed the two issues by confining
38. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1151.
39. Id. "Neither the Legislature nor the Law Revision Commission which drafted the section
could have been oblivious to the likely evidentiary use of subsequent design changes in strict
liability cases. Thus, the limitation of the section to essentially negligence causes of action must
be deemed deliberate and significant." Id. at 1153 (footnote omitted). Moreover, by 1970, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts was the majority rule, but until Ault no court made distinction
between cases brought under theories of negligence and those brought under strict liability.
Brumby, supra note 29, at 1395.
40. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1152.
41. Id.
42. Joyce M. Cartun, Note, Admissibility of Remedial Measures Evidence in Products
Liability Actions: Towards a Balancing Test, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1171, 1181 (1988).
43. See Bizzle v. McKesson Corp., 961 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1992); Huffman v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990); Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008
(8th Cir. 1989); R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985); Roth
v. Black & Decker, U.S., Inc., 737 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1984); DeLuryea v. Winthrop Lab., 697
F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983); Hemdon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir.
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Rule 407 to its terms, limiting its use to negligence and culpable con-
duct, and questioning the effectiveness of the social policy of encourag-
ing repairs."
1. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
In Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n 5 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence of a subsequent warning of
the danger of a cattle feed supplement was admissible based on the Ault
rationale. 46 The Robbins court, like the Ault court, drew a sharp distinc-
tion between the theories of negligence and strict liability. Construing
Rule 407 literally, the court confined it to cases involving negligence
and culpable conduct do not encompass strict liability.47 The court also
decided that applying the rule to strict products liability cases provides
no encouragement of remedial measures.4 1 In the case of mass produ-
cers, the court found that Rule 407 does not serve as an anti-deterrent
because manufacturers are not likely risk mass liability by foregoing
repairs, even though evidence of the repairs might be used against them
in an individual lawsuit.49
Shortly after Robbins, the Eighth Circuit in Farner v. Paccar, Inc.50
reaffirmed its decision to exclude products liability actions from Rule
407. The Farner court admitted testimony of a recall letter for a truck
sent by the defendant-manufacturer to the plaintiff post-accident. The
court held that "the exclusionary rule governing subsequent remedial
measures is inapplicable in a strict liability case because it serves no
deterrent function."'" The Farner decision applies the reasoning that
manufacturers will not subject themselves to mass liability because evi-
dence of a subsequent measure might be used against them in a pre-
repair liability case. 2
1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc. 466 U.S. 958
(1984); Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980); Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d
518 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir.
1977).
The Ault decision has been followed by a number of other state courts as well. See
Henderson, supra note 14, at 16 n.59 and accompanying text.
44. Cartun, supra note 42, at 1186-87.
45. 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 793.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977).
51. Id. at 527.
52. Id. See Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding instruction and
parts illustrating modification admissible on strict liability claim); Roth v. Black & Decker, U.S.,
Inc., 737 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1984) (allowing admission of subsequent design modifications).
1993]
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In R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,53 the Eighth Cir-
cuit extended its position by holding that the exclusionary rule of Rule
407 should not apply to breach of warranty actions. The Murray court
based its decision on the similarities between breach of warranty actions
and strict liability actions. The court found that a breach of warranty
action is similar to a strict liability action in that the focus is on the
product and not on the defendant's negligence or culpable conduct.5 4
Therefore, by confining Rule 407 to negligence and culpable conduct,
the court held that the rule is inapplicable in a breach of warranty
action.5 5 Most recently, in Bizzle v. McKesson Corp.,56 the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that Rule 407 does not prohibit evidence of a recall in strict
liability cases.57
2. THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In 1983, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals first considered the
issue of whether Rule 407 is applicable to strict liability cases in
Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc.58 In Herndon, the widows of
persons killed in an airplane crash allegedly caused by a defective
switch brought a strict liability action against the manufacturer of the
airplane. The court admitted into evidence a service bulletin published a
year after the accident notifying owners of a needed modification to the
switch. 59
In making its determination, the court reviewed Rule 407's policy
of encouraging defendants to make repairs.6" The court held that the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent conduct cannot be applied to strict
liability cases even though it is appropriate for negligence cases.61
Applying the rule "would thwart the policies that underlie strict liability
53. 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff sought to admit evidence that the manufacturer
changed the manufacturing materials and methods after the plaintiff had purchased glass that
accumulated moisture between the panes).
54. See Unterburger, 630 F.2d at 603; Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 (8th Cir.
1977); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977).
55. Murray, 758 F.2d at 274.
56. 961 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1992).
57. Id. at 721. The evidence of a recall for a different model than plaintiff's walking cane was
excluded on Rule 403 grounds.
58. 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar
Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
59. Id. at 1324.
60. Id. at 1327-29.
61. Exclusion of evidence of subsequent conduct under Rule 407 is appropriate because it
assesses liability based on the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct at the time of the accident.
Rule 407's exclusion of evidence, however, is inappropriate in actions against defendants who are
pursuing activities for which society has decided to apply strict liability. Id. at 1327.
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by an illogical imposition of a negligence-based rule of evidence."6 2
The policy rationale of Rule 407 is not applicable to strict liability
actions because (1) defendants will not risk additional lawsuits by refus-
ing to repair or make modifications because of fear that it may be used
against them by someone who has already been injured; (2) insurers
would not let insured manufacturers refuse to take remedial measures;
(3) governmental agencies and juries deliberating punitive damages
would disapprove of such behavior; and (4) there is no evidence which
shows that manufacturers are even aware of the rule.63 The court closely
reviewed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Grenada Steel Industries v. Ala-
bama Oxygen Co., which applied Rule 407 to a strict liability case.'
The Fifth Circuit relied on both the deterrence of voluntary remedial
measures and jury confusion rationales to exclude evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures. The primary basis of its decision was that
evidence of subsequent repairs has little relevance to the issue of
whether a product was previously defective.65 The Herndon court was
unpersuaded by the Fifth Circuit's policy reasoning in Grenada Steel.66
The court found that the underlying social policy rationale of Rule 407
"cannot logically be extended to strict liability defendants" 67 because the
reasonableness of a defendant's conduct is not at issue and therefore,
there is no justification for excluding evidence of its conduct. 68
In Meller v. Heil Co.,6 9 the Tenth Circuit determined that Rule 407
requires a balancing test between the social policy of encouraging
repairs and the interest in the admission of relevant, probative evi-
dence.70 "In striking the balance, it announces a clear rule: repair evi-
dence is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct, but
may be admissible for other purposes."'" Therefore, the court did not
look at the legal theory behind the action, but examined what the party
offering the evidence was trying to prove.72 The opinion states that evi-
dence of subsequent product changes is usually irrelevant to prove that a
product is unreasonably dangerous because products are modified for
many reasons unrelated to safety. Therefore, the modification is not
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1327-29.
64. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
65. Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1328.
66. "[T]he Fifth Circuit felt that it could not know with any certainty whether manufacturers
relied on Rule 407 in making post-accident decisions." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 745 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1984).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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admissible due to the relevancy concerns of Rule 401. 71
The Tenth Circuit was asked to overrule Herndon in Huffinan v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co.74 Although the court acknowledged that its
decision in Herndon is in conflict with the majority of the other cir-
cuits, 75 it refused to overrule Herndon without further discussion of the
76issue.
3. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S EXCEPTION FOR FAILURE TO WARN CASES
In DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories,7 plaintiff brought an action
for damages against the defendant-drug manufacturer for failure to warn
of certain side effects caused by its product. The trial court admitted into
evidence a subsequent change in the wording of a package insert.78 The
issue of application of Rule 407 to a products liability case involving a
prescription drug was one of first impression before the Eighth Circuit
court's. 79 The DeLuryea opinion provides an exception to its position
that Rule 407 is inapplicable in products liability actions by holding that
the rule applies in a strict liability action alleging inadequate warning for
a prescription drug.8 0
Basing its decision on the Fourth Circuit opinion in Werner v.
Upjohn Co.,"1 the court recognized the similarity between the duty to
warn in failure to warn cases and the duty of reasonable care in negli-
gence cases. Both theories focus on the actions of the defendant. The
former focuses on the defendant's failure to warn the plaintiff of the
danger, the latter focuses on the defendant's failure to take precautionary
measures to prevent injury.82 Both theories are unlike strict liability,
where the plaintiff must show that the product is unreasonably danger-
ous.8 3 The court held that excluding evidence of subsequent measures in
73. Id. "[Tihe modification itself typically does not have any tendency to make more
probable the past dangerousness of the product." Id. See supra note 3.
74. 908 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990).
75. Id. at 1481 n.24.
76. Id. at 1481. The evidence submitted did not come within the scope of the Rule 407
because the redesign of the tractor occurred before the accident. See infra notes 179-217 and
accompanying text.
77. 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983).
78. Id. at 227.
79. Id. at 228.
80. Id. at 228-29.
81. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). See infra notes 90-95
and accompanying text.
82. Werner, 628 F.2d at 858.
83. DeLuryea, 697 F.2d at 228-29. "Defendant's conduct in giving the warning is in issue.
Consequently, the reasoning in Robbins, that strict liability does not include negligence or
culpable conduct, does not apply to the circumstances of this case. Rule 407 requires exclusion of
evidence of subsequent remedial changes in Sterling's warning literature." Id. at 229.
[Vol. 48:283
RULE 407
failure to warn cases involving unavoidably dangerous drugs is consis-
tent with the meaning of "negligence," and, as a result, Rule 407 is
applicable. 4 The court did not overrule its earlier holdings that Rule
407 does not apply to strict products liability cases but carved an excep-
tion when the circumstances of the case indicate that negligence and
strict liability contain similar elements.8 5
C. Federal Circuit Courts That Apply Rule 407 to Products Liability
Cases
Despite the position taken by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, most
of the circuits hold that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is
excludable in strict products liability actions under Rule 407.86 The
majority of the circuits assumes that the application of the rule affects
behavior by encouraging repairs.87 Thus, these courts focus on the
social policy rationale behind the rule in making their decisions and find
the lack of any express mention by Congress to the contrary to mean that
Congress intended to encompass strict products liability actions within
the terms negligence and culpable conduct.8 These circuits are also
concerned that admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures
84. Id.
85. Brumby, supra note 29, at 1410. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the applicability of Rule
407 in failure to warn cases in Kehm v. Procter & Gamble, Mfg. Co., Kehm, 724 F.2d 613, 621
(8th Cir. 1983) (holding evidence of withdrawal of product from market inadmissible under Rule
407, because "duty-to-warn cases raise issues of reasonableness and foreseeability closely akin to
those present in negligence cases") and Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1013
(8th Cir. 1989) (affirming the decision in DeLuryea that Rule 407 should apply in special strict
liability failure to warn cases; evidence admitted on other grounds). In both Kehm and Donahue,
the Eighth Circuit indicates that its previous holdings that Rule 407 does not include strict liability
are still good law, and these cases are only the exception. Kehm, 724 F.2d at 621 ("But Rule 407
allows the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered for any purpose
other than to show negligence or culpable conduct," construing culpable conduct narrowly);
Donahue, 866 F.2d at 1013 ("It has long been the law of this Circuit that Rule 407 does not
preclude the introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a strict liability case.").
86. See, e.g., Prentiss & Carlisle Co. v. Koehring-Waterous, 972 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1992); Kelly
v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992); Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518
(1st Cir. 1991); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc. II, 887 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1989); Mills v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1989); Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 870 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir.
1989); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc. I, 831 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1987); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc.,
788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir.), amended, 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883
(5th Cir. 1983); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982); Hall v. American S.S. Co.,
688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1080 (1981); Longenecker v. General Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979); Roy v. Star
Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
87. Cartun, supra note 42, at 1186-87.
88. Id.
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under Rule 407 will confuse juries.89
The Fourth Circuit in Werner v. Upjohn Co.90 addressed the issue
of whether Rule 407 excluded evidence that the defendant, a drug manu-
facturer, had revised its warning that one of its products had dangerous
side effects.9' The court held that although Rule 407 does not explicitly
mention strict liability, its omission does not mean that strict liability
does not come within the scope of the rule.92 The court focused on the
underlying policy rationales behind the common law rule and Rule 407
to determine how to treat the evidence associated with a strict liability
action.93
The court conceded that under a negligence theory the focus is on
the defendant, while under a strict liability theory the focus is on the
product.94 But the court emphasized that regardless of the theory used to
admit the evidence, the policy of encouraging remedial measures
remains the same for both and should not produce a different result.95
Under either theory, Rule 407 will encourage a manufacturer to take
subsequent safety measures because he knows that such measures will
not be used as evidence against him in a lawsuit. The court concluded
on policy grounds that Rule 407 should not be applied differently in
strict liability actions than in negligence actions and excluded evidence
96 corof the revised warning. The court supported its conclusion by noting
that the distinction between strict liability and negligence diminishes in
failure to warn cases.97 The issue under either theory is essentially the
89. See infra notes 100, 103, 119 & 152 and accompanying text. This is one of the common
law concerns underlying the rule. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
90. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
91. Id. at 851.
92. Id. at 856.' The Werner court found the rule to be merely enacting the common law rule.
Id.
93. Id.
The rule simply does not speak to the question of whether the evidence should come
in to prove strict liability. To resolve this question we must examine the policy
behind Rule 407 and the common law basis for the rule, and then determine if
admitting the evidence as evidence of strict liability is more akin to the use of the
rule to prove negligence, or if it is closer to one of the recognized exceptions to the
rule. That is to say, would the policy behind the common law rule be served or
subverted if the evidence of subsequent precautionary measures was admitted to
prove strict liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 857. However, the court further noted that "[tihe reasoning behind this asserted
distinction we believe to be hypertechnical, for the suit is against the manufacturer, not against the
product." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Furthermore, the Werner court feared that admittance of subsequent remedial
measures in strict liability cases might undermine Rule 407's application in negligence cases. Id.
at 857-58.
97. Id. at 858.
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same: was the warning adequate?
In Cann v. Ford Motor Co.,98 the Second Circuit closely followed
the reasoning used by the Fourth Circuit in Werner. Cann, however, is
not a failure to warn case.9 9 In Cann, the plaintiff tried to introduce
proof that subsequent to his accident the defendant/manufacturer modi-
fied the design of its transmission and modified its owner's manual to
specifically instruct drivers to turn off the ignition before leaving the
car."° The court held that Rule 407 excludes evidence of subsequent
remedial measures in products liability actions. 1'
The Second Circuit maintained its position of applying Rule 407 to
strict products liability actions in Fish v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. 10 2 The
court found error in the trial court's decision to permit the plaintiffs to
read to the jury subsequent warnings issued by the defendant to its cus-
tomers about formaldehyde emissions from particleboard. 1°3 The Fish
opinion strongly suggest that jury confusion resulting from the inclusion
into evidence of the warning was a major factor in its decision. 104
Recently, the Second Circuit in McPadden v. Armstrong World Indus-
tries, Inc.'0 5 reaffirmed the Cann and Fish holdings that Rule 407
applies in all products liability actions, whether brought under a negli-
gence or strict liability theory.
In Hall v. American Steamship Co.,' °6 the Sixth Circuit acknowl-
edged the split among the circuits over the issue of whether Rule 407
applies to strict liability actions0 7 but accepted the social policy reason-
ing of the Fourth Circuit. °8 The court held that proof of a change in
98. 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
99. Appellants point out that a negligence action places in issue whether the
defendant's conduct was reasonable while a strict liability action involves whether
the product was defective; they note that the jury focuses on the defendant in a
negligence action, but solely upon the product in a strict liability action. However,
the defendant must pay the judgment in both situations, regardless of where the
jury's attention focused when they found against him. Since the policy underlying
Rule 407 not to discourage persons from taking remedial measures is relevant to
defendants sued under either theory, we do not see the significance of the
distinction.
Id. at 60. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
100. Cann, 658 F.2d at 59. In this case, unlike Werner, the court expressed its concern with
plaintiffs who bring actions in both negligence and strict liability. Id. at 60. The court appears to
fear that juries will confuse the two theories, undermining Rule 407 in negligence cases. Id.
101. Id.
102. 779 F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir. 1985).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 840.
105. 995 F.2d 343 (2nd Cir. 1993).
106. 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982).
107. Id. at 1066.
108. Id. at 1067. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
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policy by the defendant/shipowners to no longer wash down decks in
stormy weather was not admissible to show that the plaintiff was work-
ing under unseaworthy conditions at the time of his injury." The Sixth
Circuit arrived at this decision by equating strict liability with culpable
conduct. The court stated that the unseaworthy condition, "although a
species of strict liability, would be 'culpable conduct' within the mean-
ing of the Rule for it is such conduct that would impose liability upon
American Steamship under general maritime law." 110 The court was
then able to apply Rule 407 under the Werner rationale that the policy of
encouraging subsequent repairs applies regardless of the theory under
which the action is brought.'
In a strict products liability action by a plaintiff/truck driver against
a truck manufacturer to recover for injuries allegedly caused by a design
defect in the cab of the truck, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's exclusion of evidence of a subsequent design change under Rule
407.V 12 In Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 1 3 the court held that
Rule 407 applies to strict liability cases and that evidence of subsequent
repairs may only be admitted if one of the exceptions stated in Rule 407
is met."I4 It is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit based its decision on
Rule 407 or comparable Illinois law." 5 Although the Oberst court did
not explicitly adopt the policy rationale relied upon by the courts in Wer-
ner, Cann, and Hall, one could infer that the court implicitly relied upon
this policy rationale because of the dissent's attack on the policy of not
discouraging subsequent repairs." 6
Four years later, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Oberst holding in
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd." 7  In Flaminio, the plaintiffs
attempted to offer into evidence two blueprints of subsequent design
changes which were allegedly made to repair a "wobble" in the defend-
109. Hall, 688 F.2d at 1066. The court defined "culpable conduct" as including any conduct
"that would impose liability" upon the defendant. Id. See Cartun, supra note 42, at 1183.
110. Hall, 688 F.2d at 1066. See Brumby, supra note 29, at 1403.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
112. Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 866. See generally infra notes 212-50 and accompanying text.
115. The court makes substantial reference to Illinois case law in its opinion. Oberst, 640 F.2d
at 866 n.5. It should be noted that in an extensive dissent, Judge Swygert makes a comprehensive
survey of Rule 407 and Illinois law which leads to confusion as to which law was applied. Id. at
869-71 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
116. Brumby, supra note 29, at 1403. See Oberst, 640 F.2d at 869-71 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
Judge Swygert in his dissent accepts the policy rationale of Ault, finding Rule 407 inapplicable to
strict liability cases. Id. at 870. For a discussion of the Ault rationale see supra notes 30-41 and
accompanying text.
117. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
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ant's motorcycle."1 8 Acknowledging that the Oberst court avoided the
Rule 407 issue, the Flaminio court examined the conflict among the cir-
cuits and held that Rule 407 does apply in strict liability cases. 19
Flaminio echoed the concern expressed in Cann regarding jury confu-
sion over a case submitted on both negligence and strict liability grounds
and found that Rule 407 is applicable to strict liability cases. 2 ' The
court based its decision on the social policy reasoning underlying Rule
407 that society should encourage repairs by manufacturers.' 2 ' The
Seventh Circuit found no merit in the argument that the distinction
between negligence and strict liability justifies a refusal to apply the
rule.' 22 The court held that the policy behind Rule 407 was applicable
and found no error in the trial court's decision to exclude the
evidence. 23
Although the First and Third Circuits have consistently held that
Rule 407 is applicable to strict products liability cases, 24 there has been
little discussion of the issue by these courts. The First Circuit initially
accepted the application of Rule 407 to strict liability cases by implica-
tion in Roy v. Star Chopper Co.,' 25 where it applied the rule without
discussion. 26 It was not until Raymond v. Raymond Corp. ' 27 and Pren-
tiss & Carlisle v. Koehring-Waterous Division of Timberjack, Inc.128
that the First Circuit explicitly applied Rule 407 and held itself in accord
with the majority of the other circuits. 129
118. Id. at 465-66.
119. Id. at 468-69.
120. Id. at 469. See supra note 100.
121. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469. The court reasons that one must assume that a manufacturer
will weigh the possible use of the subsequent repairs evidence if Rule 407 is inapplicable against
the lesser probability of another accident without the repairs. Id. at 469. This rationale is
extremely weak. See infra part V.
122. Id. at 469-70. See supra note 94.
123. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 470. Almost a decade after the Flaminio decision, the Seventh
Circuit has maintained its position that "culpable conduct" includes the creation of a product
defect and therefore, Rule 407 is applicable to products liability actions. Traylor v. Husqvama
Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1993).
124. See Prentiss & Carlisle Co. v. Koehring-Waterous, 972 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1992); Kelly v.
Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d
1518 (1st Cir. 1991); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc. II, 887 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1989); Petree v.
Victor Fluid Power, Inc. I, 831 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1987); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985
(3d Cir. 1982); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916
(1979).
125. 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
126. Id. at 1134.
127. 938 F.2d 1518 (1st Cir. 1991).
128. 972 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1992).
129. Id. at 10; Raymond, 938 F.2d at 1522. It is unclear whether that the First Circuit even
impliedly accepts the social policy reasoning used in other circuits because it makes no mention of
any of the reasoning used behind any of the majority or minority decisions in coming to its
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In Josephs v. Harris Corp.,130 the Third Circuit held without further
explanation that Rule 407 is applicable to products liability actions
based on section 402A of the Restatement of Torts. 3 1 The Josephs
holding was reaffirmed in the failure to warn case of Petree v. Victor
Fluid Power, Inc. 1.132 It was not until the recent case of Kelly v. Crown
Equipment Co.13 3 that the Third Circuit gave some explanation for its
application of Rule 407 to products liability actions. In Kelly, the plain-
tiffs contended that Rule 407 does not apply to design defect cases
because, unlike warning cases such as Petree I, negligence theories play
no part in the determination of a manufacturer's liability for a product
that was defective at the time it was sold.1 34 In rejecting this argument,
the court considered whether the policies and goals of Rule 407 are fur-
thered by applying the rule to design defect cases as well as to failure to
warn cases.1 35 The court held that "[e]xclusion of subsequent remedial
evidence, regardless of the theory of the case, advances the policy
behind Rule 407 of promoting safety" and cite to Cann and Werner for
support.136 Thus, the court extended its reasoning for not differentiating
between negligence and strict liability actions to failure to warn and
design defect actions. 137
The Ninth Circuit in Gauthier v. AMF, Inc.131 addressed the issue
of whether Rule 407 is applicable to strict products liability actions.
Gauthier was a defective design case in which the plaintiff attempted to
offer into evidence subsequent design changes made by the defendant/
manufacturer of a snow thrower.1 39 The court accepted the reasoning of
Flaminio and found "no practical difference between strict liability and
negligence in defective design cases and the public policy rationale to
encourage remedial measures."1 4° The court noted that large manufac-
turers, who are usually the defendants in products liability actions, will
conclusion. In discussions of exceptions and the scope of the rule, the opinions follow a literal
interpretation of the rule or case law without any mention of policy. In Raymond, the court does
mention the twofold purpose of Rule 407 but does not discuss its application to the case. See
Raymond, 972 F.2d at 10.
130. 677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982).
131. Id. at 991.
132. 831 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1987).
133. 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992).
134. Id. at 1276. For a discussion of the DeLuryea rationale, see supra text accompanying
notes 81-84.
135. Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1276.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir.), amended 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit had
reserved the issue of Rule 407's applicability to strict liability cases in Longenecker v. General
Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1979).
139. Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 636.
140. Id. at 637.
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most likely be aware of Rule 407.14 Therefore, the application of the
rule would affect their decisions regarding the manufacturing of a prod-
uct.'42 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found the policy rationale of encouraging
repairs persuasive and adopted the majority position. 43
Finally, the Fifth Circuit took a different approach from the other
seven circuits which exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures
in strict products liability actions under Rule 407.'" The issue was ini-
tially addressed in Grenada Steel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 45
where the plaintiff brought a strict liability action against the manufac-
turer of a tank valve that caused a fire and explosion at the plaintiffs
plant. "'46 Grenada Steel wanted to introduce into evidence subsequent
design changes of the valve.'47 In affirming the trial court's decision to
exclude the evidence under Rule 407,148 the Fifth Circuit based its deci-
sion on relevancy concerns, not on policy concerns of encouraging sub-
sequent repairs as the other circuits had. 149 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit
underscored the lack of empirical evidence to support the traditional pol-
icy rationale of the other circuits. 5 ' The court dismissed academic
hypotheses as to why manufacturers take subsequent remedial measures
and reasoned from a legal standpoint that such changes are made for a
number of reasons.' 5' The Fifth Circuit held that a court should con-
sider the probative value of the evidence and question whether the prod-
uct or its design was defective at the time the product was sold. 52
141. This assertion is questionable, and there is no empirical data supporting it.
142. Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 637.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 90-143 and accompanying text.
145. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
146. Id. at 885.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 888-89.
149. Id. at 887.
150. The court states:
Voluntary change to improve a product and reduce the possible hazard to a user
should be encouraged. While there is no evidence concerning whether admission of
evidence of change would deter such action by manufacturers, the assumption in the
rule that it might have a deterrent effect is not demonstrably inapplicable to
manufacturers upon whom strict liability is imposed. But our decision does not rest
only on theses about the influence of possible tort liability on human conduct. It
rests more firmly on the proposition that evidence of the subsequent repair or
change has little relevance to whether the product in question was defective at some
previous time.
Id. See Brumby, supra note 29, at 1412.
151. Grenada, 695 F.2d at 877-88.
152. Id. at 888. In Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984),
the Tenth Circuit rejected this reasoning and came to an opposite conclusion. See supra notes 65-
67 and accompanying text.
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"Thus, instead of basing its decision on policy rationale, the court based
its decision on the confusion which could result if the jury were given
evidence of events taking place after the product was alleged defec-
tive." 113 The court further suggested that due to the focus on the time
when the product was sold, Rule 407 should be interpreted as a balanc-
ing test between the probative value of the evidence and the possibility
of jury confusion under Rule 403.154 Although uncertain of the tradi-
tional policy reasoning, the Fifth Circuit decided to take a conservative
approach and apply Rule 407 in strict liability actions. 155
IV. How Is RULE 407 APPLIED TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS?
Once a court has addressed the issue of whether Rule 407 applies to
strict products liability actions, it must then examine the scope of the
rule and the application of exceptions. This often results in inconsistent
conclusions among the circuits. Regardless of a court's decision on the
applicability of the rule to strict products liability actions, the actual
application of the rule is still dependent on its scope and exceptions,
which are also susceptible to language interpretation and policy
considerations.
A. Third Parties and Superior Authorities
Although there is little conflict over "whose" remedial measures
are excluded under Rule 407, courts have narrowly construed the scope
of parties that come within the ambit of the rule. Subsequent remedial
measures taken by non-party persons/businesses are consistently held
not to fall within the scope of Rule 407; this is in accord with the policy
of encouraging subsequent remedial measures emphasized by the draft-
ers of the rule and the courts. 56 The underlying reason is that the third
party taking the remedial measures is not influenced in its actions by
153. Cartun, supra note 42, at 1185 (footnote omitted).
154. Id. See Brumby, supra note 29, at 1400. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states: "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
155. Brumby, supra note 29, at 1412. The decision in Grenada Steel was later reaffirmed in
Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 870 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1989) and Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Inc.,
866 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1989).
156. See Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1524 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that
evidence of subsequent repairs made by an employer to a sideloader are not excludable under Rule
407 in an action against the manufacturer); Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg., 798 F.2d
700, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding memo made by employer describing subsequent remedial
measures after fatal injury to employee should not have been excluded where the employer is not
a party to the suit); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding evidence of subsequent repairs taken by non-defendant employer was not barred from
admission under Rule 407); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 889 (5th
[Vol. 48:283
RULE 407
having evidence admitted at trial. As a result, "the social policy which
forms the basis of Rule 407 is not furthered."' t5 7 Because it is outside
the scope of Rule 407, the admissibility of evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures taken by third parties is governed by the general relevancy
requirements of Rules 401, 402, and 403 and not Rule 407.158
Although some conflict exists among the circuits, admission of evi-
dence of a subsequent repair required by an authority superior to the
defendant (usually a regulatory authority) is held to lie outside the pur-
pose of Rule 407.159 "Where a superior authority requires a tortfeasor to
make post-accident repairs, the policy of encouraging voluntary repairs
which underlies Rule 407 has no force - a tortfeasor cannot be discour-
aged from voluntarily making repairs if he must make the repairs in any
Cir. 1983) (holding that evidence of subsequent design changes made by another manufacturer
who was not a party did not fall within the realm of Rule 407).
157. Raymond, 938 F.2d at 1524 (footnote omitted). See Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518,
528 n.20 (8th Cir, 1977). In Grenada Steel, the Fifth Circuit recognized that "neither the text of
Rule 407 nor the policy underlying it excludes evidence of subsequent repairs made by someone
other than the defendant." 695 F.2d at 889.
Arguably, if the third party is sufficiently interested in the outcome of the litigation,
admission of evidence of measures taken by the third party may deter him from taking such
actions. Thus, the social policy rationale is being served by excluding evidence of measures taken
by third parties. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5284.
158. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[01] at 407-12. See Raymond, 938 F.2d at
1524-25; Koonce, 798 F.2d at 720; Dixon, 754 F.2d at 584; Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 889; see
also supra notes 3 & 154.
159. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1204 (8th Cir. 1990); Herndon v. Seven
Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Piper Aircraft
Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d
1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978). But cf. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 859 (4th 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981)(rejecting plaintiff's argument to admit evidence of a subsequent
change in a warning for a prescription drug on the basis that such change was required by the
FDA).
The Werner court's reasoning appears faulty because of its refusal to accept the superior
authority argument as a bar to Rule 407. The court makes two arguments. First, the court
wrongly equates a superior authority with a third party. The court finds that any change by or
required by a third party removes the relevance of the evidence further from the central issue,
which is the adequacy of the warning at the time the product was marketed. Werner, 628 F.2d at
859. The court essentially decides the issue on grounds closer to Rule 403 than to Rule 407 and
does not rebut the social policy reasoning behind the superior authority argument. The second
argument addresses more directly the contention that the policy of encouraging repairs is not
furthered by remedial measures required by a superior authority. The court finds that there is a
dual responsibility for preparing warnings for prescription drugs. Id. The FDA can require that a
warning be changed, but it must also rely on voluntary compliance by the manufacturer in
preparing the warning. Id. This argument assumes that not only are manufacturers cold-blooded
in not making repairs, but they also need to be encouraged not to violate government statutes and
regulations. But the purpose of government regulations is to make manufacturers comply.
For a more detailed discussion of this issue see E. Lee Reichert, Note, The "Superior
Authority Exception" to Federal Rule of Evidence 407: The "Remedial Measure" Required to
Clarify a Confused State of Evidence, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 843 (1991).
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case." 1 60 A distinction is then drawn between voluntary and involuntary
repairs. 16  This makes sense in the context of products liability litiga-
tion. Government regulations and regulatory authorities are established
to protect individuals from manufacturers, which are usually more pow-
erful than individuals and have the potential to abuse that power. The
purpose of protecting the individual would be defeated if Rule 407
barred admission at trial of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
that a superior authority required the manufacturer/defendant to take,
because then only the manufacturer and not the individual benefits from
the regulation.
B. Timing: What is a Subsequent "Event"?
Rule 407 uses the term "event," but fails to specify whether
"event" is the accident or injury at issue or whether another event may
be used to determine the applicability of the rule. 162 In products liability
cases confusion exists over what the "relevant" time is in determining
whether evidence of remedial measures comes within the terms of Rule
407. Is it: (1) the date of the manufacture of the product; 63 (2) the date
of the sale of the product; 64 or (3) the date of the accident or injury in
question? 65  A close examination of this issue discloses a conflict
between the language of the rule and the social policy underlying it,
160. Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1331; see also Rozier, 573 F.2d at 1343 (trend cost estimate is
admissible under Rule 407 because it was not prepared out of a sense of social responsibility but
because a superior authority required it). Arguably, under these circumstances manufacturers
might be tempted to breach their statutory duty. See WRIGHr & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5284
n.62. But it seems unlikely manufacturers would risk government sanctions.
161. O'Dell, 904 F.2d at 1204. This same distinction also supports barring third party actions
from the exclusionary protection of Rule 407. Id.
162. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5283.
163. See Fish v. Georgia-Pacific, 779 F.2d 836, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1985); see infra note 170.
164. See Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1277 (3d Cir. 1992); Clarksville-
Montgomery County Sch. Sys. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 925 F.2d 993, 1001 n.17 (6th Cir. 1991)
(stating in dicta that post-sale documents addressing attempts to reformulate products were
properly excluded under Rule 407); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc. I, 831 F.2d 1191, 1197 (3d
Cir. 1987) infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
165. See Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding "event" in an
accident case to be the accident); Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir.
1991) (holding design modifications of a later model sideloader which were made pre-
manufacture and pre-accident, did not constitute "subsequent remedial measures" because "event"
refers to the accident); Roberts v. Harnischfeger Corp., 901 F.2d 42, 44 n.1 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating
in dicta that "event" is the date of the accident and, therefore, testimony of a decision and
implementation of a remedial measure which was pre-accident is not excludable under Rule 407);
Roth v. Black & Decker, U.S., Inc., 737 F.2d 779, 782 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding evidence of
subsequent design changes inadmissible where an electric saw was manufactured in 1975, the
accident occurred in 1980, and the modification was designed in 1974 but not incorporated until
1976); Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928
(1981) (holding evidence of pre-accident design changes were not subsequent to the "event" and
were improperly excluded under 407); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir.
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which suggests the inapplicability of the rule to products liability cases.
The rule provides that evidence of subsequent measures is not admissi-
ble, "[w]hen, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previ-
ously, would have made the event less likely to occur."'16 6 The plain
language of the rule suggests that "event" should be interpreted as the
accident or injury.167 It does not make sense in the context of "sale" or
"manufacture" that subsequent remedial measures would make those
events "less likely to occur."
If the primary purpose of the rule is to encourage safety measures
by manufacturers, then the rule should be drafted to encourage this pol-
icy before injury occurs. Thus, "event" should be interpreted as either
the manufacture or sale of the product because these are the moments at
which the product usually leaves the control of the manufacturer. As the
rule is written, manufacturers theoretically should be discouraged from
taking any added safety measures prior to injury ("event") because these
measures can be used as evidence against them at trial under Rule 407.
According to this definition of "event," the rule serves no purpose
in products liability actions. In such cases, the injury or harm often does
not occur until the plaintiff has used the product for a long period of
time. There may be a cumulative effect to the injury (as with radiation
or prescription drugs), and by the time the injury manifests itself the
defects in the product already have been remedied. In these situations,
the language of the rule would admit evidence of product repairs if
"event" is the time of the injury. But, the social policy rationale of
encouraging repairs is not served in the case of manufacturers of prod-
ucts causing injury or harm that may not surface for years. 168 A change
in the product can be made years after the accident, in which case the
changes are made for reasons completely unrelated to the plaintiffs
injury. In this instance, the evidence would still be excluded notwith-
standing the fact that the rule had no impact upon the defendant's behav-
ior. 169 If an injury does have a cumulative effect, when during the
period of continuous use of the product will the courts find the "event"
to have occurred? 7' The exclusionary rule should not apply when a
1978) (finding that the "event" was a 1973 automobile accident and therefore, a 1971 trend cost
estimate was not within the scope of Rule 407).
166. FED. R. EvID. 407 (emphasis added).
167. Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1482 (10th Cir. 1990). Furthermore,
the advisory committee's note to Rule 407 uses the term "accident." FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory
committee's note.
168. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5283.
169. Brumby, supra note 29, at 1416.
170. See Fish v. Georgia-Pacific, 779 F.2d 836, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1985). Fish is a failure to
warn case in which the plaintiffs used the defendant's particleboard in the construction of their
home. The particleboard was manufactured in 1977 and purchased in 1977 and 1978. The
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defectively-designed product was manufactured either before or after the
design was modified, but the unmodified product was delivered after the
change in design. 7 ' In this instance, the product is still under the ulti-
mate control of the manufacturer, and he should still be encouraged to
take safety measures.
The case law recognizes the difficulties in the terminology and
social policy of Rule 407 separately, but has yet to reconcile the two in a
products liability action. In Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc. 1,172 the
Third Circuit held that evidence of warning labels affixed to hydraulic
presses post-sale but pre-accident was a subsequent remedial measure
under Rule 407.173 The Third Circuit did not address the plain language
of the rule. Instead, the court focused on the rule's policies. The court
found "event" in a products liability action to be the time of sale. There-
fore, the policy of encouraging repairs was consistent with the exclusion
of evidence of safety measures made both before someone is injured and
after someone is injured. 174
In Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor,175 the Seventh Circuit held that
evidence that the defendant had conducted post-sale rather than pre-acci-
dent tests on the model of maul at issue should not be excluded under
Rule 407.176 The court justified this decision on policy grounds. The
court found that subsequent remedial measures, when used as evidence
of culpable conduct, undermine the underlying social policy rationale of
encouraging repairs.1 77 But courts must consider the policy of permit-
ting the finder of fact to review probative evidence. This latter consider-
ation weighs more heavily when the manufacturer takes remedial
measures prior to the accident. A prudent manufacturer can then limit
his liability by recalling the defective product. This made the Traylor
plaintiffs lived in the home from September 1978 until March 1980, and during that time they
developed medical problems. Defendant issued warnings of formaldehyde emissions from the
particleboard in 1983. Although the warning was still subsequent to the period during which the
plaintiffs' medical problems developed, the court referred to the relevant "event" as the time of
manufacture in 1977. Id.
171. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[01] at 407-10. Contra Raymond v.
Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding pre-manufacture, pre-sale, and pre-
accident design modifications for a sideloader did not constitute "subsequent" remedial measures);
Roth v. Black & Decker, U.S., Inc., 737 F.2d 779, 782 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding evidence of
subsequent design changes inadmissible where an electric saw was manufactured in 1975, the
accident occurred in 1980, and the modification was designed in 1974, but not incorporated until
1976).
172. 831 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1987).
173. Id. at 1198.
174. Id. For a further discussion of the Petree I decision, see Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970
F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (3d Cir. 1992).
175. 988 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1993).
176. Id. at 733. The "event" is the time of the accident.
177. Id.
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court doubt that a manufacturer is deterred from taking remedial meas-
ures before an accident occurs by the fear that such measures can be
admitted into evidence against him if such an accident does occur. The
court makes the erroneous assumption that the sole reason a manufac-
turer takes remedial measures is to limit future liability. However, the
entire basis of Rule 407 and its policy of encouraging repairs is that
manufacturers will not initiate repairs on their own.
On the timing issue, most products liability cases focus on the plain
language of Rule 407. Many decisions accept the exact language of the
rule with respect to timing without discussing the rule's social policy
rationale.1 78 In interpreting the language and history of the rule, the
Tenth Circuit in Huffinan v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 179 maintained that
the term "event" refers to the time of the accident or injury to the plain-
tiff.1 80 Following a chronological analysis of the facts, the court held
that the pre-accident design change to the defendant's tractor was not a
"subsequent measure" under the terms of Rule 407 and was therefore
properly admitted into evidence. 8' In Chase v. General Motors
Corp.,182 the Fourth Circuit defined "event" as the date of the automo-
bile accident at issue. Therefore, evidence that the automobile manufac-
turer had recalled its product one year after the accident was
excluded. 183 The court excluded evidence of a design modification
made subsequent to the manufacture and purchase of the car and prior to
the accident but later implemented by the recall.' 84
In Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,85 the Fifth Circuit recognized
the conflict between the relevant time in products liability cases and the
language of Rule 407 but made no attempt to reconcile the two different
events. 86 The court stated that the focus of a products liability case is
on whether the product or its design was defective at the time of sale; 87
the court nevertheless contradicted itself by finding the relevant time
178. See Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991); Roberts v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 901 F.2d 42, 44 n.1 (5th Cir. 1989); Roth v. Black & Decker, U.S., Inc., 737
F.2d 779, 782 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984); Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928 (1981); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978).
179. 908 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990).
180. Id. at 1481.
181. Id. at 1482-83.
182. 856 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1988).
183. Id. at 21.
184. Id. at 22.
185. 928 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1991).
186. Id. at 686.
187. Id. The court bases its reasoning primarily on the Grenada opinion. See supra text
accompanying note 154. It is noteworthy that the Grenada court's reasoning was founded on
relevancy, rather than social policy grounds. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
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under Rule 407 to be the date of the accident. 1 8 Pursuant to Rule 407,
the court held that a manufacturer's post-sale, pre-accident warning
placard and revised manual were admissible. 189 In Kelly v. Crown
Equipment Co.,19° the Third Circuit affirmed its Petree I holding by
approving the exclusion of pre-accident remedial measures. t91 The
Kelly court noted that the Petree I opinion did not confront the plain
language of Rule 407 in its opinion, but only the rule's social policy
rationale. But the Kelly court also did not directly address the language
of the rule.' 92
C. Tests and Reports and Recall Letters
1. TESTS AND REPORTS
Courts have held that post-event tests and reports fall outside the
scope of Rule 407 and thus are admissible as evidence. t93 The basis for
the admission of tests and reports is that they are prepared only for anal-
ysis of the situation and therefore do not constitute "remedial" measures
under the rule.' 94 According to the rule's plain language, an action is a
remedial measure if it would have made the accident or injury less likely
to occur had it been taken previously.195 A post-event test or report will
not make an event less likely to occur, and therefore it is neither a reme-
dial measure nor excludable under Rule 407.196 "Remedial measures are
those actions taken to remedy any flaws or failures . . . .,19 Thus,
changes may be implemented as a result of tests or reports, but the tests
or reports themselves are excludable as remedial measures.,9 8
The plain language of Rule 407 conflicts with its underlying policy
188. Cates, 928 F.2d at 686.
189. Id.
190. 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992).
191. Id. at 1277. See supra text accompanying note 173.
192. Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1277.
193. Cf Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that a pre-
accident report was not, in itself, a remedial measure; the document was held admissible under
Rule 407 on timing grounds).
194. McFarlane v. Caterpillar, Inc., 974 F.2d 176, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Prentiss & Carlisle
v. Koehring-Waterous, 972 F.2d 6, 10 (lst Cir. 1992); Dow Chemical Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co.,
897 F.2d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1990); Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d
26, 33 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989); Rocky Mountain Helicopters v. Bell
Helicopters, 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[01] at
407-12 to 407-13.
195. FED. R. EvID. 407.
196. Prentiss, 972 F.2d at 10; Dow Chemical, 897 F.2d at 487; Benitez-Allende, 857 F.2d at
33; Rocky Mountain, 805 F.2d at 918. "The fact that the analysis may often result in remedial
measures being taken . . .does not mean that evidence of the analysis may not be admitted."
Prentiss, 972 F.2d at 10.
197. Rocky Mountain, 805 F.2d at 918.
198. Id.; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[01] at 407-13.
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rationale in products liability cases. The language of the rule excludes
from its scope tests and reports by manufacturers because they are not
remedial in nature. 199 But on many occasions tests and reports are often
a preliminary (and a necessary) step toward making changes to a product
that will eventually enhance the product's safety.2°° The policy ration-
ale of encouraging subsequent repairs should extend to tests and reports,
so that manufacturers are encouraged to engage in test-taking and report-
writing as part of the process of enhancing product safety. If the social
policy rationale underlying Rule 407 is to apply in products liability
cases, evidence of tests and reports must be excluded.2°' Courts that
hold that manufacturer tests and reports are not "remedial" measures
according to the plain language of Rule 407 are also rejecting the rule's
underlying social policy of encouraging repairs in products liability
cases. One alternative remedy is to admit the results of tests or reports
at trial without referring to them as post-event. If, however, the plaintiff
characterizes the test or report as a remedial measure before the jury,
Rule 407 will apply.20 2
2. RECALL LETTERS
In products liability actions, defendant/manufacturers argue that
recall letters are inadmissible under Rule 407 because the letters are
"subsequent remedial measures. '20 3 Although courts have been incon-
sistent on this issue, the circuit courts appear reluctant to apply Rule 407
to recall letters and similar evidence. 2°4
199. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
200. Rocky Mountain, 805 F.2d at 918 ("such tests are conducted for the purpose of
investigating the occurrence to discover what might have gone wrong or right.").
201. Contra Rocky Mountain, 805 F.2d at 918. "We believe that the policy considerations that
underlie Rule 407, such as encouraging remedial measures, are not as vigorously implicated where
investigative tests and reports are concerned." Id. In the products liability context, however,
enforcing the social policy rationale could put plaintiffs at risk of not being able to admit this
highly relevant evidence.
202. Id. at 919.
203. See FED. R. EvID. 407.
204. Compare Bizzle v. McKesson Corp., 961 F.2d 719, 721 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding Rule 407
does not prohibit the admission of evidence of a recall in strict liability actions) and Kehm v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg., 724 F.2d 613, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1983) (admitting evidence of withdrawal
of product from market) and Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S.
958 (1984) (admitting evidence of aircraft manufacturer's service bulletin under Rule 407) and
Farner v. Paccar, Inc. 562 F.2d 518, 527 (8th Cir. 1977) (admitting evidence of recall of truck)
with Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 21-22 (4th Cir. 1988) (excluding evidence of an
automobile manufacturer recall letter) and Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 852-59 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) (excluding evidence of a prescription drug warning).
Note that the Ninth Circuit in Longenecker v. General Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.
1979), failed to address the issue of whether a recall letter is the "sort of 'subsequent remedial
measure' covered by Rule 407." Id. at 1286.
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Like test reports, recall letters are frequently the first remedial
action of a manufacturer. However, unlike test reports, recall letters are
inadmissible evidence not because they do not fit within the rule's defi-
nition of "measure",2 °5 but because the arguments against applying the
exclusionary rule of Rule 407 to strict products liability actions in gen-
eral also apply with regard to recall letters.2"6 First, Rule 407 does not
apply because "the issue in controversy is defect rather than conduct. 20 7
Second, application of the rule will not further the social policy rationale
of encouraging repairs because the recall action was taken involuntarily
as the result of a regulatory authority.20 8 The Eighth Circuit, in Farner
v. Paccar, Inc.,2°9 stated,
Just as it is not reasonable to assume that manufacturers will forego
improvements in products in order to avoid admission of the evidence
of the improvements against them, it is not reasonable to assume that
the manufacturers will risk wholesale violation of the [regulatory
authority] and liability for subsequent injuries caused by defects
known by them to exist in order to avoid the possible use of recall
evidence as an admission against them.21°
In an effort to resolve this issue, some states include a recall letter provi-
sion in the exclusionary rule.211
D. Exceptions to Rule 407
Rule 407's exceptions are based upon relevancy considerations that
recognize that the rule is "not applicable to the proof of a consequential,
material fact in issue other than negligence."'21 2 The use of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures for other purposes such as, but not lim-
205. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
206. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[03] at 407-26.
207. Id. Weinstein finds this argument to be much stronger when applied to the issue of
admitting recall letters. "When the plaintiff seeks recovery because of the very defect which is the
subject of the letter, the probative value of the evidence in proving the defect is usually far greater
than when the evidence of subsequent repairs is offered to show that the product must have been
defective." Id.
208. See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 267 at 204. This is based on the superior authority
argument. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
209. 562 F.2d 518, 527 (8th Cir. 1977).
210. Id. (footnote omitted). See also Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322,
1331 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc.,
466 U.S. 958 (1984) (holding that an aircraft manufacturer's service bulletin to owners, which the
court likened to "an automobile manufacturer's recall letter," is admissible where taken in
response to FAA directives).
211. See ME. R. EvID. 407 (1976) ("A written notification by a manufacturer of any defect in a
product produced by such a manufacturer to purchasers thereof is admissible against the
manufacturer on the issue of existence of the defect to the extent that it is relevant."); TEX. R.
EVID, 407(b) (1982) (same); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[03] at 407-26.
212. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[01] at 407-8.
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ited to, proving ownership, control, feasibility of precautionary meas-
ures, if controverted, and impeachment, is an exception to Rule 407.213
The rule requires that evidence of a remedial measure sought to be
admitted for other purposes must be controverted because of the com-
mon law concern that liberal admission of the evidence for other pur-
poses would undermine the social policy behind the rule.2 14  The
Advisory Committee failed to justify the "other purposes" in terms of
the policy of encouraging repairs. 21 5  Both commentators and courts
have expressed concern that the exceptions could "come close to swal-
lowing up the rule," particularly in terms of products liability
litigation.216
In products liability actions, the ownership and control exceptions
have limited applicability because the product in question is usually
owned and/or controlled not by the defendant/manufacturer but instead
by the plaintiff or a third party. For this reason this Comment focuses on
the feasibility of precautionary measures and impeachment exceptions.
1. FEASIBILITY
Feasibility "relates not only to actual possibility of operation, and
its cost and convenience, but also to its ultimate utility and success in its
intended performance. 21 7 There are two reasons for excluding evidence
offered to prove an uncontroverted issue of feasibility. First, feasibility
213. FED. R. EvID. 407. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855-56 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied., 449 U.S. 1080 (1981)("the exceptions listed in Rule 407 ... are illustrative and not
exhaustive").
214. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1991) § 407.1 n.9;
MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 267; WEINSTEIN & BEROER, supra note 10, 407[01] at 407-9. If an
issue is not controverted, no evidence is needed to prove it.
215. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5286. The best explanation may be that the second
sentence of the rule leaves the common law intact. Id. "It would seem that a person
contemplating remedial measures would be no less deterred by knowledge that his action might be
used to show feasibility of precautionary measures than he would by the fear that it might be
offered to show negligence." Id.
216. See GRAHAM, supra note 214, § 407.1 n.9; MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 267 at 203; see
also Werner, 628 F.2d at 855-56 (finding that the use of exceptions should be limited to promote
the social policy rationale of encouraging repairs).
Rule 407 is designed to protect the important policy of encouraging defendants to
repair and improve their products and premises without the fear that such actions
will be used later against them in a lawsuit. Several exceptions to the rule have
developed, but it is clear that they must be narrowly construed if the central policy
behind the rule is to be effectuated .... If this policy is to be effectuated we should
not be too quick to read new exceptions into the rule because by doing so there is a
danger of subverting the policy underlying the rule.
Id. Note that admissibility of subsequent remedial measures for "another purpose" is still subject
to the relevancy requirements of Rules 401 through 403. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10,
407[01] at 807-9 & 407[04] at 407-28. See GRAHAM, supra note 214, § 407.1.
217. Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1983).
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is an issue that almost always exists in products liability cases.218 Sec-
ond, the jury is unlikely to be able to distinguish feasibility from fault.219
Feasibility does not bar the exclusion of evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures under Rule 407 unless it is "controverted" by the defend-
ant.22° If the defendant raises the issue of feasibility, Rule 407's
protection is waived based on the theory that it is unfair to prohibit the
plaintiff from rebutting the defendant's feasibility claim. 21
Rule 407's feasibility exception is inapplicable when the defendant
fully concedes to the feasibility of a design change or precautionary
measure because feasibility is not controverted.222 On the other hand,
the defendant waives Rule 407's application when he expressly raises
the issue of feasibility.223 Confusion exists as to how the feasibility
exception should be applied to the meaning of the phrase "if
controverted."
When the defendant is silent on the issue of feasibility, there are
two interpretations of "if controverted." First, feasibility is presumed
controverted unless the defendant expressly admits to feasibility.
According to this interpretation, the defendant's silence is controverting
218. See Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983);
Henderson, supra note 14, at 13-15 ("Feasibility is part of the plaintiffs burden of proof and a
change in design may be some of the best evidence on that point.").
219. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5286 (footnote omitted).
220. FED. R. EVID. 407.
221. Kobayashi, supra note 13, at 535; WEINSmIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[04] at 407-
30 to 407-31.
222. Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991) ("In refusing to admit
evidence regarding the modifications. . ., the district court correctly determined that the feasibility
exception to Rule 407 did not apply because feasibility had been stipulated to by the parties.");
Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 870 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that evidence of a
subsequent design change of a bacon-slicing machine was properly excluded on the issue of
feasibility because the defendant "conceded the feasibility of the design change they had adopted"
after the plaintiffs accident); Fish v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 779 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding evidence of a subsequent warning was not admissible on the issue of feasibility because
the defendant "stated that it was willing to admit the feasibility of providing a warning in 1977; it
simply contended that it did not have a legal duty to do so"); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d
84, 91 (3d Cir. 1979) ("At the point in the trial at which this evidence [of subsequent remedial
measure] was offered .... there was already testimony that such repairs could be made simply,
easily and inexpensively.").
223. Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
brochure prepared by the defendant/manufacturer after the accident was admissible under Rule
407 even though the defendant claimed it was not feasible to provide warnings); Reese v. Mercury
Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1146, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that district
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an operation manual for a boat engine to establish
feasibility of direct manufacturer warnings to customers where the defendant suggested at trial
that only the retailer could properly instruct the ultimate consumer regarding a kill switch on the
engine); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1985) (admitting
evidence of alternatively designed tractors to prove feasibility where there was substantial
testimony by the defendant that the addition of protective structures to the tractor was not feasible
because the operator's visibility would be impaired).
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feasibility. This appears to be the minority position taken by the Tenth
Circuit in Meller v. Heil Co.,224 in which the feasibility of alternative
designs of a dump truck was held a controverted issue.225 In Meller, the
plaintiff had to show the feasibility of alternative designs to prove that
the product was "unreasonably dangerous." This decision was based on
the court's interpretation of the Advisory Committee's Note that exclu-
sion is only automatic when feasibility is admitted.226 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that "under these circumstances, the feasibility of an alterna-
tive design is deemed controverted unless the defendant makes an une-
quivocal admission of feasibility. 227
The Seventh Circuit apparently followed the position of the Meller
court in Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc.228 In Ross, the defendant/manu-
facturer claimed that it admitted the feasibility of its subsequent reme-
dial measures. 229 The court held that feasibility was not conceded by the
defense because the "alleged" admission took place on cross-examina-
tion of the defendant's witness after the plaintiff introduced evidence of
the subsequent remedial measure. 230 The court noted that the defendant
had several opportunities to admit to feasibility prior to that point in the
trial.23' The Ross court upheld the district court's ruling admitting the
evidence of a subsequent design change to a power saw, although the
court failed to mention whether feasibility was explicitly disputed or
224. 745 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1984).
225. Id. at 1300.
226. Id. at 1300 n.7.
227. Id. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5288.
The administration of Rule 407 would be greatly simplified if the appellate courts
were to hold that . . . feasibility of precautionary measures will be deemed
"controverted" unless the defendant is prepared to make an unequivocal admission
of feasibility. This would narrow the scope of the clause insofar as requiring
"automatic exclusion" of the evidence of subsequent remedial measures while still
leaving it open to trial courts to exclude the evidence under Rule 403 in those cases
in which the plaintiff is seen as abusing the rule for some tactical advantage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
This position is further supported in Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322,
1329 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc.,
466 U.S. 958 (1984). In Herndon, even though feasibility was apparent to the jury, the defendant
refused to admit to the feasibility of a design modification. Although the court based its decision
to admit the evidence on other grounds, the court found this test to be "sensible." Id.
228. 977 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993).
229. Id. at 1185.
230. Id.
231. Id.
The defendant could have stipulated to the feasibility, or included the admission as
an uncontested fact in the pretrial memorandum submitted by the parties, or in a
pretrial motion accompanying the submission of the memorandum. It did not, nor
did it make any objection when the district court ruled that the post-remedial
measures would be admitted because the defendant contested feasibility.
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:283
presumed disputed.2 32
Under the second interpretation, feasibility is presumed admitted
unless the defendant explicitly controverts it. According to this interpre-
tation of the phrase "if controverted," the defendant's silence on the
issue has the same effect as admitting feasibility. When the defendant/
manufacturer does not raise the issue of feasibility, the "mere assertion
that the manufacturer did not make a change does not controvert the
feasibility of change." '33 The feasibility exception is problematic
because the feasibility of a precautionary measure and the issue of the
manufacturer's knowledge of the product defect are often not distinct
issues.234 Courts have narrowly construed "feasibility" to protect the
rule's underlying social policy from liberal use.235 Therefore, when fea-
sibility is not explicitly admitted or denied, the issue is left to the court's
discretion. 236
232. Id. at 1184-85.
233. Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983). Accord
Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) ("it
is clear from the face of the rule that an affirmative concession is not required. Rather, feasibility
is not in issue unless controverted by the defendant.").
234. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[04] at 407-29 to 407-30.
235. "Several exceptions to [Rule 407] have developed, but it is clear that they must be
narrowly construed if the central policy behind the rule is to be effectuated." Werner, 628 F.2d at
855. But cf. Reese v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1428 (5th Cir.
1986) (defining feasibility broadly).
236. See, e.g., McPadden v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 995 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that feasibility was not controverted where defendant did not argue that it was unable to
issue a warning, but instead denied that its product required a warning or was defective without a
warning); Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1989) (defendants did not
contest the feasibility of a better installation instruction, but maintained that instructions in the
manual were acceptable); Probus v. K-Mart, Inc., 794 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that feasibility of alternative materials to end cap of ladder was not in genuine dispute because
plaintiff did not contend that defendants testified that the material used was the best available or
that another use would have been feasible); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir.),
amended 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that feasibility was not at issue when the
defendant argued that the safety devices were technologically and economically feasible, but the
safety problem was not great enough to warrant the trade-offs to the consumer frustration and
greater complexity of the product); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir.
1984) (defendants did not deny the technical feasibility of precautionary measures, but argued that
by making the motorcycle safer for ordinary users, they would make it more dangerous to
speeders, who were the intended purchasers of the motorcycle); Grenada, 695 F.2d at 888-89
(where defendant-manufacturer "does not suggest that another design was impractical but only
that it adopted an acceptable one," feasibility was not contested); Oberst v. International Harvester
Co., 640 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that feasibility was not controverted where
testimony indicated that alternative restraint bunks were feasible to install but would be a problem
in other types of accidents and other systems were unacceptable to the drivers); Werner, 628 F.2d
at 853-56 (holding that the warning defendant gave was adequate given the knowledge it had at
the time, which did not raise an issue of feasibility); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that trial court's admission of the
evidence of subsequent design change to car door latch under the feasibility exception was
erroneous where the defendants did not controvert feasibility but contested only the reasons for
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Despite a narrow construction of "if controverted," plaintiffs can
arguably introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures via the
feasibility exception and clever trial tactics.2 37 This argument suggests
the futility of Rule 407's exclusionary purpose. In addition, the "feasi-
bility exception" is mainly used in products liability actions, perhaps
because the courts believe that Rule 407 is inappropriate in strict liabil-
ity cases.238 In these circumstances, the issue should be decided under
Rule 403 to determine whether the evidence was offered to allow the
jury to improperly infer a product defect.239
2. IMPEACHMENT
Commentators are concerned that the impeachment exception will
"swallow up the rule" by providing a means of circumventing Rule 407
to admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove a defend-
ant's negligence or culpability.2 "° In products liability actions, the issue
subsequent design changes); Robbins v. Farmers Union Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 792 n.8
(8th Cir. 1977) ("plaintiffs' request that the defendant admit feasibility, as interpreted by the court,
placed the defendant between the rock and the hard place: [defendant] was either forced to openly
admit the fact of feasibility to the jury or to allow the plaintiffs to prove the same. This offered the
defendant little choice and it remains questionable that the issue can thus be 'controverted' within
the intent of Rule 407.").
237. See Oberst, 640 F.2d at 870 (Swygert, J., dissenting) ("Ultimately, admissibility depends
upon the effectiveness of the plaintiff's trial tactics in getting the defendant to 'controvert'
feasibility or opening itself to impeachment."); Matthew L. Kimball, Note, The Admissibility of
Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability Actions: Some Suggestions Regarding Federal
Rule of Evidence 407, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1415, 1429 (1982) ("If plaintiffs counsel can
maneuver a defendant's witness into suggesting that alternative designs were impractical, or that
the defendant's place or product was as safe as possible, then a court would receive the subsequent
repair evidence to impeach or show feasibility.").
238. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5288 (footnotes omitted).
239. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[04] at 407-31.
240. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE TEXT 479 (1989); MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 267; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 10, 407(05] at 407-37 to 407-38; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5289. See also
Harrison v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Rule 407's impeachment
exception must not be used as a subterfuge to prove negligence or culpability."); Petree v. Victor
Fluid Power, Inc. II, 887 F.2d 34, 39 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Rule 407's impeachment exception must not
be used as a subterfuge to prove negligence or culpability of the defendant."); Hardy v. Chemetron
Corp., 870 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989) ("This circuit has ... held that the trial judge should
guard against the improper admission of evidence to prove prior negligence under the guise of
impeachment."); Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 468 ("Although any evidence of subsequent remedial
measures might be thought to contradict and so in a sense impeach a defendant's testimony that he
was using due care at the time of the accident, if this counted as 'impeachment' the exception
would swallow the rule.").
It is undoubtedly true that evidence of subsequent remedial measures can be said to
contradict, and hence, in a sense "impeach" a defendant's contention that he was
exercising due care or that materials used in the manufacture of a product were
appropriate for their intended application. Yet, allowing that and no more to satisfy
the impeachment exception would elevate it to the rule.
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of admissibility of subsequent remedial measures for purposes of
impeachment is often unavoidable.142  In its case-in-chief, the manufac-
turer/defendant will normally introduce evidence that its actions were
proper, i.e., safe, not defective. 242 On cross-examination of the defend-
ant, "impeachment by reference to subsequent remedial measure[s] as
inconsistent conduct seems appropriate," 243 and the court would exclude
evidence of subsequent remedial measures under Rule 403 if the prejudi-
cial nature of the evidence on the issue of negligence or culpable con-
duct outweighs its probative value for impeachment purposes.244
As a result of this potential danger, courts have struggled to pre-
serve the integrity of the rule while maintaining the utility of its
impeachment exception. Accordingly, the circuit courts limit the
impeachment exception to "true" impeachment-"direct and significant
contradiction of the earlier testimony or proof."245 It is difficult to find a
clear distinction between impeachment of credibility and impeachment
to enter other forms of proof. The courts consistently try to maintain the
integrity of Rule 407 by narrowly construing the "impeachment" excep-
tion to include only instances when the "witness goes beyond what is
necessary and states on direct that [the] conduct [in issue] was, [for
example], the 'safest', 'most reasonable', or 'best designed product pos-
sible'. ''246 Furthermore, the rule excludes the use of the impeachment
Probus v. K-Mart, Inc., 794 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1986).
241. GRAHAM, supra note 214, § 407.1 n.ll.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Kobayashi, supra note 13, at 533.
246. GRAHAM, supra note 214, § 407.1 n. 11. See Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273,
1278 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding impeachment exception does not apply where defendant did not
make a statement that his product's design was the best or the only possible one, but only stated
that it was an excellent and proper design); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc. II, 887 F.2d 34, 42
(3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a warning decal was admissible when the defendant's expert testified
that any possibility of danger had been engineered out of the product, there was no need to modify
the product's design, and a warning would serve no purpose); Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 870
F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that evidence of rewiring of a bacon-slicer is
inadmissible to rebut defendant's position that negligent wiring had not caused plaintiff's injury
because defendant did not testify that the product was "the best" or "the safest" but had conceded
the feasibility of the design change); Public Serv. Co. v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 773 F.2d 783,
792 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that evidence of subsequent changes in plans are admissible to
impeach plaintiffs witnesses' claim that the defendant should have been able to fabricate
adequate parts from existing plans); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir.
1984) (evidence of a subsequent design change does not impeach the defendant's testimony that
he used due care; but the defendant's testimony that it would have never made the design change
qualified for impeachment purposes); Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) (evidence of a warning bulletin is admissible for
impeachment purposes where defendant testified to the safety of a backhoe when attached to a
rollbar-equipped tractor).
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exception to infer negligence or culpable conduct.247 A strong nexus
must exist between the statement one seeks to impeach and the subse-
quent remedial measure at issue. 48
By limiting the use of the impeachment exception to credibility,
defendants can avoid the use of remedial measures by admitting in hind-
sight that alternative measures could make a safer product.249 Before a
court will admit evidence of a subsequent remedial measure for
impeachment purposes, the evidence must comply with the general rele-
vancy requirements of Rules 401 and 403.250
V. ANALYSIS
The split among the circuits on the issue of the applicability of Rule
407 to strict products liability actions indicates an absence of acceptable
policy grounds for the exclusionary rule in these cases. 1 Many com-
mentators criticize the social policy rationale behind Rule 407.252 The
underlying assumption that manufacturers will not take remedial meas-
ures because these actions may be used as evidence against them is
absurd.253 The trend away from the application of Rule 407 in products
liability cases is partly due to a rejection of this assumption. 4  No
empirical evidence exists to prove that manufacturers behave the way
the rule presupposes.
247. See Hardy, 870 F.2d at 1011 ("Evidence of subsequent measures is no more admissible to
rebut a claim of non-negligence than it is to prove negligence directly."); Probus v. K-Mart, Inc.,
794 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that if plaintiff admits evidence of subsequent
remedial measures to impeach defendant by contradicting his testimony that he used due care,
then "allowing that and no more to satisfy the impeachment exception would elevate it to the
rule"); Public Serv. Co., 773 F.2d at 792 (court reluctant to admit evidence of subsequent changes
in design plans for the purpose of showing that earlier plans were inadequate or to show that the
manufacturer was aware of the inadequacy of the earlier plans).
248. Harrison v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that a more
direct form of impeachment by use of subsequent remedial measures would have existed if the
defendant's witness had stated that he did not change the product after the alleged accident, rather
than stating that the product, as it was, was not hazardous).
249. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5289.
250. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[05] at 407-41. See Dollar, 561 F.2d at 618
(holding admission of subsequent warning bulletin for impeachment did not cause unfair prejudice
to the defendant under Rule 403).
251. Brumby, supra note 29, at 1414.
252. See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5282; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note
10, 407[02] at 407-15. "[In view of the devastating criticisms that have been made of this
rationale, it is difficult to see how anyone favoring the preservation of the rule could regard it as a
sound justification." WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5282.
253. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[02] at 407-12. Some critics argue that no
empirical evidence exists to support the claim that Rule 407 substantially affects manufacturing
decisions on design modifications. Stewart & Andreas, supra note 28, at 78 n.26 and
accompanying text; Brumby, supra note 29, at 1417.
254. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 267.
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Commentators suggest that defendants will make repairs regardless
of the rule out of fear of further tort liability. 255 "[Ilt is highly unlikely
that a manufacturer would deliberately [refuse to take remedial meas-
ures] merely to come within the scope of an exclusionary evidentiary
rule, particularly in light of the liberalized scope of punitive damage
awards." 256  The admission of evidence of subsequent repairs will
encourage remedial action because a manufacturer of mass-produced
goods risks increased tort liability if he allows defective goods to remain
on the market unremedied.257 A manufacturer's failure to take safety
measures also can result in a violation of a government regulation 258 and
the loss of customer goodwill. In addition, a manufacturer is already
motivated to improve the safety of its goods by the pressures of con-
sumer organizations, government agencies, and the media.259
Many defendants are not aware of Rule 407 or of the fact that sub-
sequent repairs will not constitute an admission. Those who are "would
surely regard it as a leaky shield in view of the many exceptions that
would admit the evidence. ' 26° How can a manufacturer be encouraged
to take remedial measures if there is a large probability that his actions
will be admitted under one of the rule's exceptions? Even if a particular
circuit excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures, the evi-
dence can be admitted either by way of the narrow scope of the rule261
or one of its exceptions.262 The inconsistency among the circuit courts
on these issues, whether because of the rule's language and/or social
policy rationale, produces a high degree of uncertainty as to the admissi-
bility of the evidence.
Much of the social policy rationale of Rule 407 is already incorpo-
rated into the strict products liability theory. Under the Restatement of
Torts,2 63 a plaintiff does not need to show negligent conduct on the part
255. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5282; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10,
407[02]; Reichert, supra note 159, at 851-52,
256. Kobayashi, supra note 13, at 545.
257. Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DuKE L.J. 837, 848-
49.
258. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[02] at 407-15.
259. Note, supra note 257, at 849. See Reichert, supra note 159, at 853.
260. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5282 (footnote omitted). See WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 10, 407[021 at 407-15. "Even if the defendant is as cold-blooded as the rule suggests,
his awareness of the many exceptions to the general exclusionary rule would make it risky to
refrain from making the needed repairs." Id. See also Kimball, supra note 237, at 1429 ("Rule
407 . . . is unlikely to achieve its ostensible objective because it is subject to so many
exceptions."); Reichert, supra note 159, at 851 ("[tlhe defendant that knows enough law to realize
that a court will not admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures on the issue of negligence
also will realize that a court can admit the evidence for other purposes.").
261. See generally supra notes 156-211 and accompanying text.
262. See generally supra notes 212-50 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 36.
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of the defendant but does need to prove the defective nature of the prod-
uct.264 Thus, courts can impose liability on manufacturers for their
defective products regardless of their failure to breach any standard of
due care.26 5 But, in order to prove a claim of strict liability, "all relevant
information concerning the product" must be made available to the trier
of fact in order to make a determination of whether the product was
unreasonably dangerous.266 This use of the strict liability theory encour-
ages manufacturers to produce safer products to avoid greater liabil-
ity.267 Thus, "to the extent that admission of such evidence results in
recovery by injured plaintiffs, it can be argued that evidence of subse-
quent repairs encourages future remedial action. 268
The application of Rule 407 to strict liability actions can have the
effect of preventing the plaintiff from using relevant evidence, thereby
increasing the probability of the plaintiff losing the suit and bearing the
financial burden from the loss. 2 6 9 But manufacturers and corporations
are better able to incur this liability because they can spread the losses
by increasing prices.27° Plaintiffs often have no access to direct evi-
dence, such as records and memoranda concerning the production pro-
cess, and must rely on circumstantial evidence, including subsequent
remedial measures, to prove that a defect existed.27' "Relevant evidence
should not be excluded from a products liability case by an obsolete
evidentiary rule when modern legal theories, accompanied by economic
and political pressures, will achieve the desired policy goals. 272 If evi-
dence of a subsequent remedial measure is relevant under Rule 401 and
probative under Rule 403, then its exclusion undermines not only the
policies underlying strict liability, but also those Rules of Evidence.273
As the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 407 suggests, the social
policy rationale must still be balanced against the interest of admitting
relevant evidence.274 The underlying social policy rationale, however,
does not adequately function or serve its purpose due to the exclusions
264. Carol Proctor, Casenote, Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures and Products
Liability: Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 857, 859 n.12 (1984).
265. Brumby, supra note 29, at 1395; Note, supra note 257, at 848.
266. Henderson, supra note 14, at 13.
267. Note, supra note 257, at 848; Proctor, supra note 264, at 869.
268. Note, supra note 257, at 848.
269. Brumby, supra note 29, at 1413; Note, supra note 257, at 848; Proctor, supra note 264, at
869.
270. Brumby, supra note 29, at 1395. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 267, at 204.
271. Proctor, supra note 264, at 873-74 n.115.
272. Note, supra note 257, at 850.
273. See Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc. 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
274. See Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297, 1299 n.4 & accompanying text (10th Cir. 1984).
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and exceptions of Rule 407.275 Rule 407 is an inappropriate means of
determining the admission of evidence in products liability cases
because the social policy underlying the rule is not served. Instead of
emphasizing the social policy, relevancy concerns should be the focus of
the exclusionary rule for products liability cases.
Several commentators suggest the use of Rule 403,276 or a similar
balancing test, to determine the admissibility of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures. Rules 401 through 403 are still concerns because
Rule 407 does not require exclusion, and the exceptions are not neces-
sarily mandatory.2 7 7 The courts have often determined the ultimate
issue of admissibility of the evidence of subsequent remedial measures
in terms of Rule 403 either (1) explicitly; 278 (2) implicitly by using the
language of Rule 403 in a Rule 407 analysis; 279 or (3) a Rule 407 "bal-
ancing approach" which weighs the need for the evidence. 280  Thus,
Rule 403 has become a viable alternative to Rule 407.
275. See supra part IV.
276. See WnsaIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 407[03] at 407-23 ("[Tlhe most desirable
approach is to treat products liability cases as governed by Rule 403 rather than Rule 407, thereby
giving the judge discretion to admit the evidence of subsequent repairs when relevance exceeds
prejudice to the defendant."); Kimball, supra note 237, at 1433 ("In conjunction, Rules 402 and
403 can render Rule 407 superfluous by excluding subsequent repair evidence without ever
reaching Rule 407."); Proctor, supra note 264, at 870 ("[I1n products liability cases, a judge
should be allowed to exclude evidence of subsequent repair at his discretion under Rule 403,
rather than be compelled to exclude such evidence under the mandate of an arbitrary rule such as
Rule 407."); Reichert, supra note 159, at 878 ("Rule 403 should continue to provide an alternative
basis for defendants to argue for exclusion of remedial measures."); Kobayashi, supra note 13, at
576-77 ("The basic concern is not strictly theoretical purity but the integrity of the 'truth' and
'fact-finding' process in trials," but "provision of adequate safeguards against undue and unfairly
prejudicial effects and inferences" is still needed); Cartun, supra note 42, at 1192 ("The most
appropriate vehicle for dealing with remedial measures evidence in strict products liability actions
is a rule 403-type standard."). For the text of Rule 403, see supra note 154.
277. Kobayashi, supra note 13, at 511.
278. See, e.g., Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 584 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Any
evidence not excluded by Rule 407, of course, must still be relevant and its probative value must,
under Rule 403, outweigh any dangers associated with its admission."); Herndon v. Seven Bar
Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1328-29 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft
Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984) (holding that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures should not be automatically admissible under Rule 407; but the evidence's
potential for prejudice against the defendant must be weighed against its probative value under
Rule 403); Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863, 570 (7th Cir. 1980) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that Rule 403 be used instead of Rule 407).
279. See, e.g., Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983)
(resting its decision to exclude the evidence on "relevancy" grounds, rather than on policy
concerns); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 1979) (where there was already
testimony as to the feasibility of repairs, the introduction into evidence of subsequent repairs
would "have been cumulative at best and prejudicial at worst").
280. Reichert, supra note 159, at 878. See, e.g., Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297, 1300-01
n.8 (10th Cir. 1984) (Rule 407 balances the social policy of encouraging repairs against the
competing interest of admitting relevant, probative evidence).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to promote fair-
28128ness and uniformity of treatment.28 2 The absence of any clear stan-
dard in the application of Rule 407 by the circuit courts has led only to
uncertainty for products liability litigants.283 This uncertainty is costly
for both plaintiffs and defendants. In the interest of fairness and uni-
formity, there are some possible solutions. First, the Supreme Court
should finally address the issue and provide a guidepost for litigants.
Second, in light of the inapplicability of the rule's underlying policy
rationale of encouraging repairs, Rule 407 should be amended so that it
would not apply to products liability actions. Third, admissibility
should be decided based on the general relevancy requirements of Rules
401 through 403.284
Finally, empirical studies should be undertaken to determine the
effect of the rule's social policy rationale on manufacturers. Mass pro-
ducers may in fact actually be motivated by the exclusionary rule. If this
is the case, then Rule 407 should be amended to harmonize the plain
language of the rule with its social policy rationale for products liability.
The rule should explicitly include products liability actions, and the
meaning of "event" should be clarified. Omitting Rule 407's exceptions
and replacing them with a form of Rule 403's balancing test would
allow plaintiffs to introduce highly relevant evidence and prevent
defendants from being "unfairly" prejudiced. Consequently, this may
result in greater predictability and fairness in the application of the
exclusionary rule.
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